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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Office of Legislative Liaison

Washington, D. C. 20505

Telephone: 351-6121 25 Sep 84

TO: Committee on Foreign Affairs
House of Representatives

Attn: Elisa Harris

Attached are your notes which have been properly stamped. The documents have been returned to HPSCI for Ivo Spalatin with a request that they be returned to CIA on 5 Oct.

I am requesting approval for copies of the Annexes. I will send them on to you if approved.


Liaison Division

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FORM 3-79 **1533** OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

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TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE
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REMARKS:		
<p>FYI -- This is where the HFAC staffers are coming from (re the briefing on Tues)</p> <p><i>23 Oct 84</i></p> <p><i>sent to</i> ALA , ALA NESA EURA OGI </p>		
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Committee on Foreign Affairs

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FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Tuesday, September 25, 1984

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
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BERDES ON 225-5021

FASCELL RAPS STATE DEPARTMENT FOR LAX ANTI-TERRORISM PROGRAM

Chairman Fascell Releases Foreign Affairs Committee Report/Schedules
Action on Money Request

Promising "swift action on the President's request for \$360 million for urgent upgrading of U.S. embassy security" House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Dante B. Fascell (D. Fla) said that "Throwing money at the problem will not alone assure better security. Why did they wait until after the bombing to ask for the money?"

"For the last year" Fascell said, "the Committee has urged the State Department to seek any needed funds and we have promised swift action. What has been lacking is a clear decision to give embassy security the real, and not just the rhetorical, priority it deserves."

"Our investigation shows that security advice is ignored or sidetracked. There is no policy that assures that security related decisions are not routinely subordinated to other, often mundane, considerations. Moreover, our investigations indicate a bureaucratic mess within the Department which hinders swift and effective action to protect U.S. diplomats."

Fascell made his comments in connection with the release of a House Foreign Affairs Committee study of U.S. embassy security and anti-terrorism programs and an announcement that the Committee will act on the Administration's request tomorrow morning, Wednesday, September 26 in 2172 Rayburn HOB.

The staff report, a summary of which was released today, concludes that the State Department has not provided the programs sufficient priority, and that urgent action is needed to streamline State's bureaucracy to prevent future tragedies.

The on-going study was carried out prior to the bombing last week of the American Embassy in Beirut at Fascell's direction.

"While not directly linked to the Beirut incident," said Fascell, "the bombing is symptomatic of the problems covered in this report. In that sense it is applicable. Even more important," emphasized Fascell, "in releasing the report now my intent is to prevent future incidents. The report identifies serious deficiencies in our anti-terrorism programs. Only when we identify and solve fundamental problems are we going to avoid additional tragedies."

Fascell noted that as Chairman of the Subcommittee on International Operations he initiated legislative efforts to counteract terrorism in 1979, even prior to the Iran hostage-taking incident, and more intensely thereafter. As part of that initiative, the State Department was provided with \$145 million to strengthen U.S. security programs abroad.

"I ordered the current staff study as part of my continuing concern with the problem and as a basis on which I can continue those efforts in the future. I am determined to monitor this situation on a regular and urgent basis in order to insure the safety and security of Americans serving abroad," Fascell said.

The review was conducted over the last six months in Europe, the Middle East and Asia to evaluate U.S. diplomatic security and State Department counter-terrorism programs. Two additional segments of the staff study are scheduled to be concluded next month in Latin America and in Northern Africa and South Asia.

Although the detailed report remains confidential it has been shared with the Department of State. The partial findings made public today addresses such issues as the effectiveness of the Department's security enhancement program, the role and effectiveness of intelligence, terrorist threat warnings, and state supported terrorism. (A partial summary of the study's findings and recommendations is attached.)

Fascell noted that the comprehensive effort by his Committee was undertaken in conjunction with a package of anti-terrorism legislation requested by the Administration which is now pending before Congress. "The Beirut bombing is only the latest tragic example underlining the urgency of that legislation. I intend to get this legislation enacted before Congress adjourns," he added.

The anti-terrorism legislation was originally introduced on May 8 as four separate bills, and was followed by extensive hearings and negotiations with Administration officials. The House Foreign Affairs Committee will act on those elements of the legislation under its jurisdiction on Wednesday. That action, in cooperation with the other Committees of jurisdiction, will be incorporated into a single omnibus bill which Fascell hopes to have enacted before the scheduled early October adjournment of Congress. That bill:

- provides for rewards up to \$500,000 for information regarding threats and acts of terrorism;
- urges the President to seek greater international cooperation against terrorism;
- requires a report by February 1, from the Secretary of State's recently appointed Advisory Panel on the security of U.S. diplomatic missions abroad; and
- implements two treaties already ratified by the United States: the Montreal Convention on Aircraft Sabotage and the U.N. Convention on Hostagetaking.

Countries included in the staff report were Spain, Italy, Turkey, Austria, West Germany, England, France, Kuwait, Syria, Jordan, Israel, Egypt, Japan, Korea, Hong Kong, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines and Taiwan. The staff team conferred extensively with State Department security officials and intelligence agency representatives. In each country the team also carried out thorough on-site evaluations of physical security enhancement programs at U.S. diplomatic facilities and met with various host country anti-terrorism experts, including law enforcement officials.

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SELECTIVE SUMMARY OF FINDINGS FROM THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE STAFF STUDY REPORT ON DIPLOMATIC SECURITY AND COUNTER-TERRORISM EFFORTS

General Findings:

-- Despite improved efforts and reasonably effective intelligence, regrettably little is known about terrorist groups. On the whole, such groups are intelligent, efficient, highly dedicated and motivated, small but well organized and disciplined.

-- Indigenous terrorism, like revolutions, thrive in the atmosphere of social unrest, economic deprivation and other root-problem causes.

-- Generally, terrorist groups are deterred by strong security programs. Accordingly, they seek the easiest, least secure targets. Away from hardened mission facilities, isolated U.S. diplomats and military personnel going to or from work in their own vehicles are typical and frequent "easy" targets.

-- Improved coordination of security programs and anti-terrorism efforts will, at best, minimize but never completely eliminate the risk to Americans abroad.

-- Even in high-threat diplomatic posts, failure to implement security enhancement programs expeditiously has subjected American personnel to undue risks.

Effectiveness of State Department Security and Anti-terrorism Efforts:

-- The Department's performance has been plagued by overlapping and sometimes competing bureaucratic structures. This bureaucratic labyrinth results in too many delays, breakdowns and confusion. Examples abound of extended wasteful and counterproductive time delays.

-- The Department lacks an efficient structure to deal with the increasing security problems encountered by our diplomats at U.S. facilities abroad. Rather, it is an amalgamation of offices and bureaus with overlapping interests vying for turf and attention which results in unnecessary division of funding responsibilities. Rigid decision-making on funding hampers flexible use of monies and prevents effective and prompt response.

-- The Department's Office of Security lacks adequate staffing. Often unpredictable and frequently spontaneous demands require the Office to draw resources and manpower away from the Security Enhancement Program - an already thinly-staffed function both in the Department and abroad - to the labor-intensive duties of protecting the Secretary of State, ambassadors and other visiting dignitaries, and of conducting security investigations. The Office of Security also lacks adequate staffing to allow emergency reaction teams to be deployed without jeopardizing other functions.

-- Coordinated and conscious attention is necessary regarding the problem of installing complex security systems in American diplomatic missions. For example, greater use of the Navy's Seabees should be made in installing such systems. In addition, further research and development on such systems is needed.

-- American embassies, especially those located in old and historic buildings, are subject to strict and sometimes unworkable restrictions imposed by host governments. As a result, various aspects of security enhancement programs are often precluded or delayed by time-consuming negotiations.

-- The security enhancement of U.S. missions abroad is hampered by the fact that many such facilities are located in rented buildings.

-- Changes in embassy personnel, especially ambassadors and administrative officers, too often produce delays and cost increases in

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security enhancement programs. In addition, security personnel levels, including Marine guards, are frequently not filled to authorized strengths.

-- The ultimate authority of the ambassador to override recommendations of the Office of Security often weakens the overall security of our diplomatic missions.

-- An impediment to the Department's efforts to protect U.S. diplomatic personnel abroad is a certain sense of fatalism. Despite determined training programs, periodic briefings and reminders, and other precautionary measures, many U.S. diplomats continue to slide into carelessness or apathy.

-- In a number of U.S. diplomatic missions abroad, glaring deficiencies exist which have not been corrected.

Role of Intelligence:

-- Strong and timely intelligence is clearly the most effective first-line defense against terrorism. Generally, U.S. and host country cooperation with respect to anti-terrorism intelligence is effective. This cooperative effort is best left to an ad hoc arrangement rather than a formalized, structured system. Relatedly, a number of countries express an interest in receiving additional counter-terrorism training for their police and security officials.

-- Within the United States' own many-faced intelligence gathering and dissemination effort there appears to be a proliferation of reporting. That problem is compounded by periodic lack of complete analysis of raw intelligence information. The combined end result of these problems is qualitatively and quantitatively negative. Too many "false alarm" reports have the effect of inuring intelligence consumers. Quantitatively, an excess of intelligence reporting -- sometimes conflicting and even contradictory in fact -- generates a confusion and frustration within the intelligence consumer community.

-- Advance intelligence on planned terrorist attacks is extremely difficult if not impossible to obtain because of the difficulty of infiltrating terrorist groups.

-- Because terrorist operations are becoming increasingly sophisticated and internationalized, it is difficult to predict when, where and how an attack will occur. Where terrorists once operated in a few regions of the world and resorted to such simple tactics as kidnappings and random assassinations, they have now expanded their areas of operation and employ such tactics as rocket attacks and bombings. The likelihood is that terrorists will begin to resort to such sophisticated techniques as aircraft, helicopters, and chemical and biological warfare attacks.

Host Country Attitude Toward Terrorism:

-- The question of a host country's attitude toward terrorism is one of degree determined by a number of factors. For example, the need and desire to increase economic and commercial opportunities with a given country or region can and does influence the host country's decisions on how forcefully it may pursue a potential threat, allow the presence of known terrorists or permit the arrest of suspected terrorists.

-- The diplomatic, political, and historical aspects of a host country strongly influence that country's own susceptibility to terrorism and the vigor with which it pursues an anti-terrorism policy or works cooperatively with the U.S. in doing so.

-- Generally, one of the best and most effective first-line defenses for American diplomatic missions abroad lies with host country security resources. While the U.S. efforts -- ranging from

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marine guards to the most sophisticated technology -- are important and necessary, they are ultimately futile without the direct and prompt support of local police.

The Internationalization of Terrorism:

-- There is compelling evidence of growing cooperation among separate terrorist groups throughout the world. Beyond the ideological bent which provides them a natural cohesiveness, there are increasing indications of overt cooperation and mutual support among national and regional terrorist groups.

-- The basis for terrorist groups cooperation is often built on personal relationships which start when they train together. In turn, such friendships make "contract cooperation" actions easier to arrange. This cooperation can also involve operational coordination and financial assistance among various terrorist groups as well as logistical help, specialized training, and intelligence sharing. For the United States a negative aspect of this growing cooperation is that events in one part of the world can produce terrorist reactions against U.S. diplomats in other parts of the globe.

State-Supported Terrorism

-- Countries which provide direct support to international terrorist groups or engage in terrorist attacks do so in order to influence policies of other countries, to establish or strengthen their influence regionally or world-wide, and to eliminate or terrorize dissident exiles and nationals from adversary countries. A number of countries are extremely active and aggressive in supporting and using organized terrorist groups to accomplish these various objectives.

-- Such countries systematically provide money (including proceeds from narcotics trafficking and other illicit activities), arms, false documents, safe havens, use of diplomatic pouches to transport weapons and explosives, and giving diplomatic status to terrorists in their embassies.

SELECTIVE RECOMMENDATIONS BASED ON THE FINDINGS OF THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE REPORT ON DIPLOMATIC SECURITY AND COUNTER-TERRORISM EFFORTS

-- The Secretary of State must make clear to all American diplomatic personnel that security has the highest priority and that any actions which may undermine security enhancement programs will not be tolerated.

-- The Department of State should establish world-wide standards for the physical security and operating procedures at all U.S. diplomatic missions abroad which should be implemented by the Office of Security and which cannot be countermanded by the resident ambassador.

-- The current diffusion of budgetary, planning and execution responsibilities within the State Department's security program must be corrected immediately by drawing together all of the Department's various overlapping, confusing, and wasteful activities into a single, coordinated authority.

-- Although these are problems with any sole-source procurement arrangement, the Department of State should give serious consideration to such arrangements for the various elements of its security enhancement program for American missions abroad. A sole-source procurement procedure would greatly facilitate installation, repair, and maintenance of such complex items as security doors and other equipment.

-- The United States should increase specialized anti-terrorism

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training to the appropriate law-enforcement units of allied and friendly nations. Supportive reinforcement should also be considered for anti-terrorism training programs sponsored by such organizations as the International Association of Chiefs of Police.

-- The United States should immediately expand its program of technical and financial assistance to the immigration and customs agencies of allied and friendly countries in order to improve control of border crossings. Linking such systems into an international network would help greatly to minimize the current free movement of terrorists.

-- Where feasible and possible, every consideration should be given to exploring with host governments the issuance of regular license plates to American diplomatic and military personnel. The use of special and easily identifiable diplomatic and military license plates single out such personnel and make them easy targets for terrorists assassins.

-- American ambassadors, usually the highest profile and most lucrative target for terrorists, should continue to be provided nondescript armored cars of foreign make and well-trained drivers. Larger American-made cars only single out its occupant and make evasive action more difficult in crowded traffic and narrow streets.

-- One short-range but effective means of enhancing the security of U.S. diplomatic and military personnel abroad is to convene regular and periodic meetings of those responsible for anti-terrorism programs. Such regularized meetings would help to increase idea-sharing, coordinate efforts, and standardize procedures. Currently, such meetings are conducted only ad hoc, usually after a crisis, and have no systematic follow-through mechanisms.

-- The Department of State should increase the number of professional security personnel assigned to our diplomatic facilities abroad. This would include augmenting the current number of Regional Security Officers and Security Engineering Officers. An increase in the number of these personnel overseas is necessary in light of the size and complexity of the Department's security program abroad.